What is collected

Tracemason monitors agent activity in development environments, which contain sensitive material. This page states exactly what leaves a developer's machine. It is written so that an organization can share it with its developers as-is.

Tracemason observes agents, not people. It does not record keystrokes, screens, prompts or time spent.

Never collected, at any level

  • Prompts and assistant responses
  • File contents, including the text written or replaced by an edit
  • Command output (stdout / stderr) and tool responses
  • Environment variables
  • Conversation transcripts
  • Error messages (only an error type is recorded), unless the level is extended

Collection levels

The level is set per organization (Settings → General) by an Owner or Admin, is visible to every member, and is printed by npx @tracemason/cli init and npx @tracemason/cli status. The server enforces it again on arrival, so a sender cannot store more than the organization's level allows.

Field Minimal Metadata (default) Extended
Session id, timestamps, agent name, model ● ● ●
Tool name, action category, outcome, duration, exit code ● ● ●
Programs invoked by a command (git, psql) ● ● ●
Repository slug and branch ● ● ●
Whether a sensitive path was touched (yes/no) ● ● ●
File paths (project-relative; home directory collapsed to ~) ● ●
Network hostnames referenced by commands (no paths, no query strings) ● ●
Command text, after redaction ●
Tool error message, after redaction ●

How commands are handled

At minimal and metadata, the command string never leaves the machine. The collector parses it locally and uploads only the classification — for example database.destructive, the program names, and the hostnames it refers to.

The classifier tokenizes the command and inspects its structure; it is not a list of regular expressions over the raw string, so echo 'rm -rf /' is not mistaken for a deletion. It is also not a shell interpreter. Commands it cannot see through — eval, command substitution, encoded payloads piped into a shell — are marked opaque, and the dashboard says their classification is best-effort.

Redaction

Two layers, applied on the sender and again on the server:

  1. Allowlist. Only known metadata keys are forwarded; everything else is dropped. Nested objects are never forwarded.
  2. Pattern scan. Remaining strings are scanned for credential shapes: private keys, AWS / GitHub / Anthropic / OpenAI-style / Stripe / Slack / Google keys, JWTs, bearer tokens, URL credentials, and NAME=value assignments whose name suggests a secret.

Pattern matching is a second line of defence, not the first. At the default level there is very little free text to scan.

Where data lives

  • In transit: collectors and SDKs refuse any endpoint that is not HTTPS, except localhost.
  • At rest: Tracemason does not encrypt rows itself. Encryption at rest is provided by your PostgreSQL deployment's storage encryption; whether it is on depends on how you deploy.
  • Credentials: ingestion keys and invitation tokens are stored only as SHA-256 hashes. A key is shown once, when created.
  • On the developer's machine: ~/.tracemason/ holds the ingestion key (mode 0600) and the outgoing queue.

Retention and deletion

Events are deleted after the organization's retention window by an hourly worker; each run is recorded under Settings → Data & retention. Owners can delete an organization and everything in it. See Data retention.

Access

Five roles — Owner, Admin, Security Analyst, Developer, Viewer — enforced on the server. The full permission matrix is shown under Settings → Members. Sensitive changes are written to an audit log.

Third-party AI providers

Tracemason does not send event data to any AI provider. There is an organization setting recording consent for future AI-assisted trace summaries; that feature is planned and not implemented, so the setting currently has no effect.

Claims we do not make

Tracemason holds no security certifications. Hook-based enforcement is not tamper-proof (see Claude Code collector).